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ABSTRACT

Paradoxical Leadership:
The Rise and Fall of Richard M.

Ni_xon

Andrew P. Langins

2008

Non-thesis (MLs97) Project
This case study analyzes the leadership of the 37th
president of the United States, Richard Nixon. Nixon was
elected during a time of uncertainty and turmoil in
America. He assumed a goal-oriented transactional/
transformational style of leadership and his first term
pragmatic domestic policies had considerable success. For
example, despite a congress controlled by the opposition,
Nixon provj-ded massive funding to the arts, established the
Environmental Protection Agency, and expanded affirmatj-ve
acti-on. In f oreign af f airs he was the f irst U. S . president
to vi-sit communist China and the Sovi_et Union.
The key obstacle for Nixon's presidency was the
Vietnam War . Ul-t imatel y hi s criminal hehavior in Watergate
led to his resignation and his aspirations were defeated by
weakness of character.
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INTRODUCTION

The focus of this case study is to explore and analyze

the leadership style of Richard M. Nixon, thirty-seventh
President of the United States.
transactional/Lransformational

Richard Nixon possessed
leadership characteristics

as described by Max Weber in 1949 and further researched by
James MacGregor Burns in his book Leadership (1978).

displayed a pragmatic, opportunistic style within
transacLional-/ transformational
employed the transactional

He

a

leadership model. Nixon

leadership model of motivating

people hy reward and punishment in order to achieve his
domestic policy ref

orms

.

Transf ormational- Ieaders, on the

other hand, "change the realities

of Itheir ] particul-ar

world to more nearfy conform to [their]
(covey, 7991, p.285) .

values and ideals"

As Nixon progressed thru his career

the transformation from Transactional to Transformational
style became more apparent as he attempted to bring America
out of the Viet.nam War, to end confrontation,
f

or an era

o

f negot iat

This analysis will

j-on

and strive

.

discuss the implications

of Nixon's

leadership style change as it affected the man and his
career.
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LTTURATT'RE REVIETT

In the twentieth century no other leader personified
the transactional-/ transformational

leadership model with

as much complexity and dichotomy as Richard M. Nixon.
Aitken (1996) charact.erized Nixon as 'tthe contrast between
darkness and liqht'

private virtues,

(1

)

.

The auLhor stated, " [Nixon,

s]

considerable though they were/ sometimes

confficted wit.h early pressures of his public career" (Z).
He felt

that Nj-xon was unfairly

treated as a wj-cked person

by the methods he used to rapidly ascend in public l-ife.
Aitken qualified

his statement by quoting Dwight

Eisenhower's words when speaking of the A1ger Hlss case

l_n

1951: t'The thing that surprised me most was that you not
only got Hiss, but you got him fairl-y" (2) .
good

Nixon was

transactional l-eader who carried out the letter

law in the Hiss case as wel-l as the will

party. Nixon's use of offensive political

a

of the

of his political

rhetoric to

make

a point, however, often caused ambivalence and distancing
of hls peers.
'*Livi-ng in the arena of presi-dential pofitics

and the

presidency brought changes in Nixon's character" (Aitken,
7996, p. 4) . Nixon felt

j ustif ied with his political_

of an'tunscrupulous player of hard bal-I" (Aitken ,

-7
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ethic

1996,

p. 4 ) .

He was af f ected by watching "the deter j-orating

standards of the presidency during the 1960's. .

[and

decidedl the way the game's gotta he played* (Aitken, 1996,
p.4 ) .

Aitken stated, **Nixon had good instincts

spoke as president-efect
togethe rt tt

(4 )

of the need to 'bring

As President, Nixon played

.

when he
us

a

Lransformational leadership ro1e, developing domestic and
foreign policies.

The President could not brlng the

country together, however. * [Nixon had] the right strategy
but [he] was the wronq man to make it work" (Aitken , 7996,
p.4).

The President allowed himself to be corrupted by the

power of his of f j-ce.

Instead of allowing his basic system

of values to work for him, Nixon used bad judgment and took
reckles s

gambl-e

s to achieve hi s

ends

.

t' [Nixon

] came to

believe that the President was impregnable under the
(Aitken, 7996, p.5)
In the final

l-aw"

.

analysis, Aitken felt

that Nixon's

leadership was too harshly criticized in light of hls
strong virtues of t'international- ideali-sm and his Iifelong
dedication to racial equality"

(Aitken, 7996, p.5).

A study by Beland and Waddan (2006) discussed the
difficulties

of pre-emptive l-eadership. Nixon was "elected

on the back of short term public disapproval of the
previous regime that reversed the underlying ideological

-8-

and pofitical

currents" (p.65) . Under difficult

circumstances, with only a l-imited mandate, Nixon tried to
work with the Republican Party. Accordlng to (Kotlowski,
2001, p, 3), he was *'persuIing] a strategy of 'moderation'

in order 'Lo unify the
woui-d never gain

ma

j

GOP'

as 1t was clear that the 'party

ority status if either 1ts liberal- or

conservative wing was 'sliced off"'
Waddan

(as cited in B6land and

, 2006, p. 70 ) . Nixon' s work to unify his party, in

order to bring about reforms, had limited success.

The

President's Family Assistance Plan alienated conservatives
who feared ttundermining work

ethics and traditional family

values" (B61and and Waddan, 2006, p. 73) .

The plan passed

in the House, but was stopped in the Senate Finance
Committee. Nixon' s creative social legislation
pass because it was outside the traditional-

boundaries. Nixon is

remembered

did not

ideological

for the scandals, but

must

also be credj-ted with visionary transformational
leadership.

Mazlish (1970) stated, *'Nixon defines a leader as one
able to act in a crisis"

(BB1 .

Nixon al-so stressed,

'*a

Ieader wi-thout a crisls is almost a contradiction in terms"

(88). Richard Nixon created crisis to succeed in securing
a Congressional and Senate seat. He felt that "crisis
enhances a leader in the eyes of his followers" (88).
-9

-

For

most encounters he faced, Nixon prepared well- but faced the
agony of indecision: "whether or not Ito] release the

aggressive impulse"

( 90

)

. After the fight or release of

aggression, t'1et down, guilt,

followed"

( 90

).

and self j ustif ication

Nixon rose rapidly to the Presidency by

following this crisis pattern.
Rlchard Nixon's leadership by crisis helped to advance
his early political

career/ servJ-ng him we 11, but clouded

his judgment as President,

when making decisions and

solving problems required the advice of others

-

The study by McAndrews (1998) discussed Richard

Nj-xon's stand on school desegregation between the early
1

950' s and

President.
belief

1 97

0' s when Nixon was Vice President, and

Nixon's views can be traced to his mother'

in equality between races.

The President,

s

who

attended Duke Univers i-ty in the Jim Crow South / corrmitted
himsel-f to one nation.

As Vice President he endorsed the

Brown vs. Board of Education decj-sion of L954, lobbied hard

for the Civil Rlghts Act of 1957 and 1960, and spearheaded
the Eisenhower Administration's
discrimination
L92)

effort

to eliminate

in the issuance of government contracls (p.

.

After winning the 1968 Presidential election, Nixon
(p.19a) on desegreqation
began a *tcalcul-ated wafflIing]"
- 10 -

due to a mixture of principfe

and polltical

concerns.

According to McAndrews, Nixon was not willing

to antagonize

people of the South, but al so st.ood by the constitutional
mandate of racial desegregation.

As vice president, Nixon took his rol-e
transactional

as

leader seriouslyr fldking firm decisions.

As

President, he acted more in the rol-e of a political
or pragmatist than a visionary transformational

tactician
leader.

Richard Nixon was a good manager in his early career
and as Vice President.

to that of transactional/

expanded

Thi

will

As Presi-dent his leadership style

s

paper will

transformational

expand on the l iterature

discuss how Nj-xon, wit.h a torturous and

authoritarian

personality,

leader.

revi-ewed

.

It

someurhat

carried out the functions of the

highest office in the country.
Transactional.,/Transformational. Leadership Theory
According to James MacGregor Burns, t'Leadershj-p is

of the most observed and l-east understood

one

phenomena on

earth" (Burns, 197B, p. 2). Burns reasoned that leadership
has character j-stics of power but unli ke plain power, it
cannot be separated f rom follower interact j-on. *A1l
leaders are actual or potential- power holders, but not all
,

l1-

Augsburg Cr;liege l*iDratI'

power holders are leaders" (Burns, L978, p. 18) .

"Some

define leadership as leaders making followers do what
fol-lowers woul-d not otherwise do, or as leaders making
followers do what the leaders want them to do" ( Burns,
7918

, p.

19 )

.

This view is one sided, sel-f limiting

often transitory.

and

rt serves the purposes of the power

holder and not the group as a whore. Burns defines
l-eadership

ds

r

"leaders inducing followers to act for certain goals
that represent the values and the motivations-the
wants and needs, the aspirat j-ons and expectations-of

both l-eaders and followers.
leader-follower

relation

persons with different
power potential,
coflrmon

is in the interaction

of

levels of motivations and of

including ski1l,

or at least joint

the essence of the

in pursuit of

a

purpose (Burns, 1-978, p. 19) .

This communi-cation manifests in two forms/ Transactional
style and Transformational- styIe.
Transactional leadership is based on a transaction,

or

the exchange of something of value the leader possesses or
contro]s that the

f

ol-l-ower want s in reLurn f or his /her

services: a style based on basic reward and punishment. It
is most effective

when a cl-ear chain of command is needed.

If performance expectations are carried out in a normal
-12-

manner, leaders do not interfere.

rf expectations are

exceeded, praise and reward (merit salary adjustments/

increased benefits

are given,

)

Corrective action is

applied for performance bel-ow expectations.
goals are satisfied,

new

When basic

higher order goals can he set.

Transactional- leaders have three characteristics.

First, they

work wit.h team members

unequlvocal goals and

ma

to

determi_ne

ke certa j-n workers get

promised rewards for achieving those goa1s. Second,

they exchange rewards (and promi-ses of rewards ) for
worker effort.
self-interests

Third, t.hey respond to the lmmediate
o

f

f ol-

lowers whose interest s can

be

met whife the job is being done. So, transactional

leadership invol-ves specified exchanges of effort

for

reward and a close relationship between goals and
rewards .

(

Bryant, 2003, p.37)

Transactional l-eadership "requires a shrewd eye for
opportunity I

a

reciprocat ing"

good hand at bargaining, p€rsuading,
(

Burns

, lgJ B t p.169) .

This leadership style

of directiveness and acti_on orientati-on is often associated
with the milltary

and governmenL leaders such as President

Char1es de Gaulle of France and Presldent Lyndon Johnson
when he was a legislative

feader.

-13-

"Transforming leadership occurs when one or

more

persons engage with others in such a way that leaders
and fol-l-owers raise one another to higher levels of

motivation and morality.

Their purposes, whlch might

have started out as separate but related,
case of transactional

ds in the

leadership, become fused,

Power

bases are l-inked not as counterweights but as mutual

support for

coflImon

purpose. Various names are used

for such leadership, some of them derj-sory: elevati.g,
mobil_:-zing, inspiring,

exalting,

exhorting, evangef i zing .
moral j-stic,

ultimately

of course.

upfifting,

preaching,

The rel_ati_onship can be

But transforming l-eadership

becomes moral in that it

raises the level

of human conduct and ethical aspiration of both leader
and l-ed, and thus it has a transforming effect on

both."

(Burns, 1978, p. 20)

Transformational l-eadership takes effect. when the merits of
transactional

leadership are exhausted. Eollowers are

now

at a skill- l-evel where they can be raised morally and
motivationally.

rnstead of motivating by reward

punishment, transformational
coaches, inspiring

and

leaders serve as mentors and

followership.

These leaders, who may be

found at all levels of an organization,

-14-

seek to improve

others. They inspire followers to use their unique skills
and tal-ents for a higher purpose. Transformational leaders
*'change

the realities of Itheir] particu]ar world to

nearly conform to [their]
p .28 5 )

values and

idea.l-

s

"

(Covey

more

,

1992

,

. To Burns, trans forming leaders, generally within

social movements, politics r or executives, connect with
followers to elevate the values of the followers to
higher level .

Bernard Bass

(1

98 5

a

) modified Burns' concept

of transforming leader to Transformational leadership,
which focuses more on the character of the Leader rather
than the process in which the leader particlpates.
Bass, transformational

For

leaders increase followers,

confidence in themselves as well as their expectati-ons of
success. Today transforrnational

leadership is the term

most commonly used in discussions of leadership.

Po].itics l{ith Restraint 1953-1961
From the beginnlng of his political

career, Nixon

assumed his transactional- leadership role with enthusiasm.

As Vice President under Eisenhower he energetically
accepted the Eisenhower Administration poli-cies.

When a

question of policy did arise Nixon followed the President's
l-ead. According to Hatf ield,

because

"N

j-xon coul-d perform

smoothly j-n the several roles that Ei senhower needed
-15-

fill-ed,

he was able to cultivate

the j-mage of an active

important Vice President" (Hatfield,

and

7997, p. 437) .

Eisenhower delegated most disagreeable tasks to Nixon.

This started when he was asked to contain Senator Joseph
McCarthy's criticism

of the administration

for being too

soft on communism. Nixon successfully contained the
at.tacks by devising a strategy that led eventually to
McCarthy being censured by his own colleagues.

Another immediate order of business for the Vice
President was to help the administrati-on defeat the Bricker
Amendment. Republican Senalor John Bricker, concerned that

a

U. S.

President could compromise the sovereignty of the

United States by enterlng into agreements with fore i gn
naLions, introduced a constitutlonal
that

pos

s

to limit

amendment

ibi l ity and to increas e the inf l-uence of Congress

in making foreign policy.

Despite Republ j- can support in

Congress, Eisenhower f elt that t.he amendment would

seriously restrict

the necessary powers of the President
(Hatfield,
and make the nation *'helpless in world affairs"
1997, p. 437) .

The President, however, was unwilling

take the role of the party's spokesperson, sending
and others to broker a compromi se with

Senator would not comply, Nixon actively

-

16 -

Br j-c ker

.

to

Nj_xon

When the

lobhied for a l-ess

vigorous substitute, which passed without splitting the
party.
Aside from managing special assignments, Nj-xon was the

administration's political

expert. He atten,Ced Cabinet

meetings and contributed his insights on the j-mport.ance of

selling the Republican Party to the publ-ic. The vice
President was careful- not to propose major objectives, but
only suggested methods,
A Vice Presidential activity

that Nixon did not

foresee was temporarily assuming presidential
responsihitities.

Nixon provided the necessary leadership

al-l- the while maintalning Eisenhower' s team approach,

leading wj-thout appearing to l-ead during Eisenhower' s three
medical absences.
It appeared that Rj-chard Nixon was an exemplary VicePre

s

ident and transact iona I ]eader in the

administration.

Ei senhower

His performance j-n of f ice helped to

make

the role of Vice President more prominent and to enhance
it.s constitutional

import.ance. By the time Eisenhower

decided to run for reelection in 1956, however, he

was

looking for a running mate with leadership quatities that
coufd carry the party j-nto the next decade. Eisenhower did
not see the mature leadership qualities

in Nixon.

To

Eisenhower, the presidency belonged to statesmen not
-17-

partisan politic

j-ans

.

Nixon, understanding the President'

motives and t.he tremendous potential

s

for advancement in the

Vice Presidency, went to Eisenhower stating his interest

in

being the President's running mate in the next election.
In order to gain full- party support, Eisenhower chose Nixon
and again easily won the election.

Nixon expanded the duties and vislbility
President.

of the Vice

The Republ- j-can Party noticed his political

astuteness and ability
used these skills

as an effective

campaigner. Nixon

to begin to building a stage for his

greater ambitions.

The Vice President continued to fulfill

his obl-lgations, but he was also setting his eyes on the
next prlze I the White House.
*'Of the f ive pres idential
a direct participant,

campaigns in which

i he

I

was

none affected {Richard NixonI more

personally than the campaign of 7960" (Nixon, lgg0, p.
2L4).

The Vice President's reputation was tied to

the Eisenhower Admini-stration, however, which his rival
Governor Nelson Rockefeller and the Democrats easily

attacked.

Nixon had advocated a tax cut to stimulate the

economy, but Eisenhower wanted a balanced budget.

The Vice

President al-so fought for increased defense expendltures

- l8

-

and an invasion of Cuba, which the President refused.

Although Nixon was successfuf in winning the Republican
nominatlon and t'had travel_ed over 65,000 miles and

visited all fifty

states" (Nixon, 1990, p. 223), the

election appeared to hinge on a weak Republican Party base,
having to campaign in the shadow of Eisenhower's popular
administration,

and

the television

debates. Eisenhower,

s

heart condition did not allow him to defend his

Adminlstration. His support of Nixon was in question:
*[W]hen asked what major ideas lNixon] had contributed as

vice President: [Eisenhower replied] 'rf you give me a
week, f might think of one"' (Nlxon, 1990, p. Zlg) .
The Nixon-Kennedy Debates, vlewed for the first

on television, drew much more interest than radio.

time
The

public were swayed by the candldates appearance, rather
than their knowledge of subject matter. Nixon also could

not discuss cl-assified administration matters that

were

introduced by Kennedy. rn the end Kennedy's "victory
margin was a mere half a percent. . ."
p.63) .

(Greenstein, 2004,

"Within a few days after the electj-on [Nixon] was

already thinking about what Ihe] woul-d do next af ter

I

hi

s]

fourteen years in public l-ife came to an end on January 20,

7961" (Nixon, 1,990, p.

221

).

-
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The Private Citizen 1961-1957

Richard Nixon spent a large part of

61 writ.ing his

19

book Srx Crises and considering hls next career move.
returned to California

He

to run against Governor Edmund (Pat)

Brown. Thls t j-me, unlike the campaigns of 1946 and 1950,
Nixon needed to master California
1itt.1e knowl-edge or interest.

issues of which he

Many Californians

that the former Vice Presldent's attraction

was

speculated

to the

governorship was a prelude for the Presidency.
the other hand,

Brown,

a popular, approachable governor

understood the needs of his const j-tuents.

had

oD

who

*Nixon lost by

close to three hundred thousand votes out of six million"
(Dallek, 2001, p. 29) .

In a post election news conference,

Nixon said to what he felt

was a hostil-e liberal

Just think how much you' re going to be

mj- s s

press:
ing .

You

won/t have Nixon to kick around anymoref because,
gentlemen, this is my last press conference, and it
will

be one which I have welcomed the opportunity to

test wits with you (Black,

200'7

, p. 442) .

Nixon then smiled, waved and left.
Rj-chard Nj-xon never seriously considered leaving

politics

and public servr-ce.

To Nixon, "politics

was the

only way he had ever been 'someore,' and though the risks
of permanently l-osing that identity
-20 -

were considerable,

he

coul-d not give up a l-ast chance to reach his lif e' s goa1"
(Da11ek

,

200J

, p. 32) .

When he f elt

emotional

de j

ect j-on

Nixon would remember his mother telling

him from her

deathbed: "Richard, don't you give up.

Don't let anybody

tel-l you you are through" (Nixon ,

L990

to 7968, Nixon calculated his activities
time frame of the 1968 presidential

, p. 289) .

He

Europe, Asia, the

Middle East, and Af rica meeting with worl-d l-eaders
gaining an expertise in international
Nixon

a l-

19 63

to be within the

nomination.

traveled abroad extensively visiting

From

concerns. At

and
home

so t ravel-ed throughout the f i f ty staLes becoming

acquainted with and cultivating

a rapport with as many
Republican leaders as possible. t'Nixon was ext remely
conversant with every conceivable domestic and foreign
issue, but he seemed always

conviction politician,

more

of a tactical

than

a

except sometimes in matters of war

and patriotism" (Black, 2001, p.486) .

The former Vice

Presldent'tMatured in the sense of coming to grips with his

fear of failure and his death wishes toward the fat.herfigure Eisenhower" (Mazl-ish, L910, p.103). He returned to
become

stood

a successful- Eastern corporation lawyer. $ixon

bac

k in the 7964

pres ident

ial electi-ons

President Lyndon Johnson decisively defeated

-2t

-

when

ult.raconservatlve Barry Gol-dwater. He regarded his
decision as t'the single most important step that he took

on

his return to power during [his years out of office]"
(Johns, !999, p.3).

party's unifier.

The defeat allowed Nixon to hecome the

He campaigned tirelessly

for the

Republican Part.y and was rewarded with the party's success
in the 1956 congressional- elections
press attention and funding.

Nixon

r

attracting increasing
sold himself with

expertise in foreign af faj-rs.
The former Vice President foresaw the Vietnam War as

the main j-ssue in the 1968 campaign. Johnson' s commitment
of over five hundred thousand troops by that year gave
Nixon, who thrived on oppositionr a central theme. As

a

private citizen,

Nixon constantly criticj-zed

Vietnam policy.

"As a respected voice in foreign affairs

Johnson's

and as arguably the Republican Party's leading spokesman

on

Vietnam, Nixon forced the Administ.raLion to acknowledge and
respond to his rhetoric,

which spurred Johnson to greater

involvement in the war" (Johns. 1999, p.1).
himself in a no l-ose situation

Nixon

saw

with his stance on the war.

If America would make concessions or withdraw, Nlxon coufd
blame Johnson for his failures.

If the United States

escal-ated and became victorious,

Nixon could paint himself

n.)

AS

having had the solutions.

free himself from the 'loser'
On January 15,

1 9 58

Either way Nixon wanted to
image.

, Nixon announced to his cl-osest

family and friends that he had decided to run again.
Because of his tactj-cs durlng the Johnson administration,

the former Vice President was partially
Vietnam situation

responsible for the

he inherited when he assumed the

Presidency.

The National Stage

The 1968 election year looked good for Republicans.

Desplte Lyndon Johnson's landslide victory over Goldwater
:_n

1964, the Vietnam War and urban unrest sharpfy reduced

Johnson' s popularity.
among
new

Nj-xon assembled media consul-tants,

those H.R. "Bob" Haldeman, who helped him create

a

image. Nixon became more statesman-1j-ke, mature and

less combative. Television was used extensively to reach
large audiences using question and answer formats.

Nixon

stood alone without. a podium answering questions from
audience surroundlng him in tiered bleachers.

an

He also took

pains not to antagontze medla. Richard Nixon was preparing
himsel-f for a new role as President and transformational
leader of his country.

At the Republican Party Convention,

-zJ-

Nixon won the nomination on the first

bal1ot, with Maryland

Governor Spiro T. Agnew as his running mate.

fn his acceptance speech, Nixon described the problems
in America as he saw them. He blamed American failures
ending the war in Vietnam, the troubled

in

economyf

lawl-essness, racial violence and hostilities

against

Amerj-cans abroad on the country' s leadership.

The

Republican nominee accepted the challenge to provide

new

leadership for America.
The Republican Convention was orderly/

compared t.o the

tremendous disturbance of the Democratic gathering in

Chicago. The Vietnam War had split
Ant

iwar

cand

the Democratic Party.

j-date Eugene McCart.hy had gained enough support

in the New Hampshire primary to cause Johnson's withdrawal
from the race on March 31. Robert Kennedy then entered thg
race, winning the California
life

primary in June and l-osing his

to an assassin' s bulIet the same night.

A,Cministration loyalists

who nominated Hubert H. Humphrey

as their candidate defeated antiwar demonstrators at the
convent ion

.

Nixon campaigned against Democrat Hubert H.

Humphrey

and thlrd party candidate George Wallace on a vague

plat f orm promising an honorabl-e peace in Vietnam with
secret plan to end the war.

a

He also promised to restore
-24 -

law and order in cities,
end the military

crack down on i1Iegal drugs, and

draft.

Richard Nixon's general e1ection campaign started with
a sizable lead over Humphrey. His refusal to debate
Humphrey and his success in urging South Vietnam to refuse

taking part in peace talks proposed by the administration
t'The final returns of the
helped him to a narrow victory.
19 68 pres j-dential election showed that [Ni-xon] had def eated
Humphrey by only 500,000 votes (Nixon, 1990, p. 351), a

margin of less than one percent of the vote.
became the first

Nixon also

president elected without his party

winning either House of Congress since the nineteenth
century.
on January 20, 1969, Richard Nixon became the 37th
President of the United States.

He had been in politics

over twenty-two years as a Congressman, Vice President, and
now Pres ident .

Nixon had evolved f rom an int.ense

anticommunj-st/opportunist to a transactional

leader as Vice

President, and now hoped to take on the role of
trans f ormational l_eader and peacemaker

a

.

rn his First rnaugural Address, Nixon stated,

r.The

greatest honor history can bestow is the titl_e of
peacemaker" (Nixon, 1969, para. g) .

This statement

descrihed the kind of l-eader the new president envisioned
-25
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himself becoming. In his address, Nixon discussed the
promise of equality for all racesf his helief
youth, and the beauty of celebrating 't.

in today's

. the

basi-c

things- such as goodness, decency, l-ove, kindness"

(NJ-xon,

!969, para . 23) .
Domestic Policy

Despite critics'

expectations that Nixon woul-d have a

"do nothing" presidency in regards to domestic affairs,

the

President had hopes to transfer the country's wealth frorn
conflicts

abroad to the urgent needs at home. His interest

in politics
in

wel-f

was heavi-1y influenced by the lmportant reforms

are pof icy, civ11 rights,

the environment, and

1aw

enforcement.

After taking office,
restructuring

Nixon proposed a ful1

of the qovernment.

He felt

that the swollen

and sluggish federal- bureaucracy/ especially preval-ent

since the Frankl-in Roosevelt erar buried creat i-ve
entrepreneurship under mountains of red tape and promoted
dependence and handouts.

He called his new system'tNew

Federal-ism, " which diverted money and power away from the

federal government and directed it toward the states.
On the topic of civil

busing.

rights,

Nixon opposed school

Nixon's calculated attempt to sl-ow school
-26-

desegregat j-on was manif est in his puhric poricy.

President stated: t'It]ransportation

The

of pupils heyond normal

geographic school zones for the purpose of achieving racial
balance wil-l not be required" (McAndrews, 1998, p.190).
secretary Leon Panetta denounced the speech, s
*"perpetuation' of segregatj-on and tslick rational: zation
HEW

for retreat"'

(McAndrews, 1998, 190).

This was a sharp

rebuke, and not unwarranted. The southern strategy,
showing roots in the 1940's and popularized by Nlxon

strategist
Repu,bi

Kevin Phillips

ican najority

in his 1969 book The emerging

referred to methods used to win

elections in the South by explolting

racial anxiety

white votersr using race as a wedge issue.

among

Nixon supported

this strategy which, with the help of strom Thurmond,
helped to secure hi s nomination and win the el-ect ion in
1968. viewed as reqressive by many, it targeted
disenfranchised whites by hiqhlighting
issues like bussing and desegregation.

racially
Many felt

charged

the

Republican Party was moving away from the center, with
Nixon leading the way. Despite this focus, the percentage
of all-black

school-s during the Nixon Administration

saw

drast ic reductlon.
Nj-xon felt

pressure from environmental and. consumer

groups
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a

and proposed legisl-at ion that created the Department

of Natural Resources, Occupational Safety and Health
Administration
Agency

(EPA)

.

(OSHA)

and the Environmental Protection

The clean Air Act of 1gT0 was perhaps

one of the most significant

legislation

pieces of environmental

ever passed (*Richard M. Nixon,,, 2008,

articl-e-214055, p. 5) .

Foreign Affairs
*'On

the adminj-stration's third day in office

INati-onaI

Security Advlsor Henry Kissingerl began implemenLing
Nixon's plan to ensure White House dominance of foreign
pol:-Cy" (Dal-Iek, 200J, p. 100).

president Nixon organized

the Whlte House to protect his energy, time, and to protect
against an inhospitabl-e political

environment.

His mode of

operation was secret I often without the permj-ssion or
knowledge of the State Department. The President's main

operative was Henry Kissingrer, whose inf luence over foreign
policy was possibly greater than any presidential- advisor
in history.
were left

Routine matters and administrative
to chief of staff,

business

H.R. Haldeman, council to the

President, John Erlichman, and White House l-iaison, Charles
Col- son

.
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In his First Inaugural- Address, the President
redef ined the

Amer

j-can role in the world by stating:

t'After

a period of confronLation, w€ are entering an era of
negotiation

(Nixon , 1969, para. 52 ) . Nixon I acti_ng as a

change agent,/transformati-onal leader, started a withdrawal-

of American troops from vietnam.
initial
U. S .

Nixon felt

that

an

wit.hdrawal would gain public favor, dllowing the

to achleve an honorahle end to the Vietnam War. OnIy

with an end to the war woul-d Nixon be free to give proper
attention to other great international

challenges.

Priorit j-es that the President and Kissinger identl f 1ed were
reduclng tensions with the Sov-iet Union, establishing
diplomatic ties with China, and promoting Middle East peace
tal-ks.
On July 25, 1969, during a brief

stay in Guam, the

President formally gave notice that the United States would
henceforth support democratic nations by providing them
financial

and military

aid, but not troops.

The

announcement, which was the basis of Nixon's foreign

policy,

became known as the Nj-xon Doctrine.

rt was also

part of the President's promised secret means of winning
the war. Nixon introduced what would be called
*vietnamization," supporting south vietnam with money and
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equj-pment while gradually wlthdrawing Amerj-can soldj-ers

from combat. When the President. called for a cease-fire
and a unilateral- withdrawal of American troops, North
Vietnam refused to negotiate.

war.

The failure

They intended to win the

of negotiating with Hanoj- frustrated

Nixon who saw it as a setback in endlng the war before the
L912 el-ections

.

To Nj-xon Vietnam "overshadowed everything e1se, all

the time, in every discussion, in every opportuni_t.y, in
every problem" (MacMiIIan, 200J, p. 120) .

Nixon

had

promised peace with honor during the electlon campaign and

that was what he

going to deliver.

was

Nixon knew his reelection depended

on

ending the

Vietnam dileflrma. He and Kissinger also knew the damage the

war had done to the United States internationally

as wel-l

as at home. The Soviets were watching with pleasure as
superpower was failing

a

to crush the smal-l developing North

Vi-etnam. At the same time they were advancing their
nuclear weapon capabif it j-es and expanding their military.
Nixon was very reluctant to become involved in Middle
East negotiations.

"For Nixon and Kissinger, the Middte

East was like a j iqsaw puz zle with mi-ssing and rnisshapen
pieces" (Dall-ek, 200J, p. 171).

The State Department

was

interested i-n the admi-nistration pursuing a more assertive
-30-

Middle East policy while Nixon felt
needed in vietnam.

more attention

was

Nixon needed to appease the state

Department, but it also made him less inclined to rely on

the depart.ment to manage Middle East strategy.

Nixon

followed the Stat.e Department persistence to hotd Four
Power tal-ks that included proposals for fsraeli-Jordanian

and fsraeli-Eqyptian

settlements.

"Golda Meir called it

fsraeli

Prime Minister

'appeasement of the Arabs, and tLhe

gravest blows to rsrael's

most. vital

interests"'

(Da11ek,

20A1, p. 179).

Richard Nixon believed that "[1]ife

for everyone is

(Mazlish, 19J3, p. BB). Leaders are
to act in crises and t'. . . a l-eader without crisis is
series of crises"

almost a contradiction
The President. felt

in terms" (Mazlish, L913, p.

t.hat all great leaders thrive

challenge and are best when the going is hardest.
viewed the Vj-etnam conf l-ict,

difficulties

a

abl_e

gZ)

.

on
He

and the Middle East

as exhausting, but at the same t.ime

exhilarating.
Nixon's crisis l-eadership s ki1ls were even f urther
challenged
U.

when

the Soviet Union threatened to surpass the

S. and Great Britain

in nuclear capabilities.

In 1963,

Presj-dent Kennedy signed an aqreement with the Soviets and
England to limit

atmospherj-c testing of nucl-ear weapons.
- 31 -

This was the only treaty to date.

In November L969, Nixon

proposed to the Sovi-et Uni-on a f ixed value standard.

Each

was to possess enough arms to guarantee the dest.ruction of

the other, thus preventing either from starting
a long deadl-ock, the first

war. Afters

results of SALT I came in

1917 with signing of the Anti-Ballistic

May

Missile Treaty and

certain standards with respect to limitations

of strategic

offensi-ve arms. This helped to improve cooperation between
the United States and the SovieLs.
Nixon was very interested in continuing tal-ks with the
soviet union and beginning dialogue with china.

He

established 1i-nes of secret communication beti,ueen the

U. S.

and China through secret i-ntermediaries in Romania and

Pakistan known only to Kissinger and hlmself.
He felt

this secrecy was necessary because Congress

wanted the vietnam issue settled before embarking on

relations with China. The conflict. with Vietnam, which
had hoped to be resolved within the first
presidency, however, dragged on.

he

six months of his

Instead of winding

down,

the war in I ndochina was escalating into Laos and
Cambodia. Nixon,

who

was convinced that negotiations

shoul-d always be carried out from a position of strength,

approved B-52 raids against northern Laos and their

sanctuaries in eastern Cambodia. Domestj-c pressures for
-32-

troop reduction and Cabinet memher disapproval of expanding
the war outside of Vietnam convinced the President to
deliver a progress toward peace address to the nation
April

on

In the address, Nixon credited his program

20 , 791 0 .

of Vietnamization as succeeding, despite problems with
enemy activlty

in Laos and Cambodia.

said, required

an

aggressive military

to appease anti-war protesters,

Such activity,

Nj-xon

response. fn order

Nixon promised another

troop wlthdrawal of 150,000 over the next twel-ve months.
With his approval raLing increase from fifty-five

percent

t.o sixty-two percent after the April 20 speech, Nixon

was

more confident to complete his next move.

In early ApriI,

Nixon met secretly with Admiral John

McCain, father of Senator John McCain of Arl zona,

reinforced the Presi-dent' s belief

who

that if North Vietnamese

forces were not stopped they would soon take Cambodia's
capitolfelt

Phnom Penh

and continue further.

The President

that if the U.S. forces joined with the South

Vietnamese army, the Communists could be driven out of

Cambodia. On April 26, Nixon authorized an attack on

enemy

forces in Cambodia against the advice of his entire White
House organization.

Defense Secretary Laird had predicted

that the Cambodia operat ion would not be deci s i-ve and Hanoi
would replace its l-osses. The Secretary proved to
-JJ-

be

correct.

The invasion not only fail-ed to inspire

confidence in Vietnamization, it emphasized Nixon's
ineffectiveness

during periods of stress.

Within a two-

month period t.he United States and South Vietnamese armed

forces withdrew, allowing North vietnam to take back
prevj-ously lost areas and wj-den their control of northeast
Cambodla.

Throughout the ordeal, Nixon released his stress in

b:-zarre behavior.

According to Kissinger, * [t]here was no

true Nixon" (DaIIek, 2001, p. 206) .
ref lective,

philosophical,

stoical

impetuous, impulsive, and erratic

"There was
N

a

j-xon; and there was an

one" ( Dallek ,

200J

, p.

206). Nixon viewed the Cambodi-an episode as a test of his
manhood and resilience

to stress.

"Nixon's fhighest priority]

in the aftermath of

Cambodia was not to consolidate or expand al-l-eged gains

against the Communists, but to qulet dissent in the United
States and repel congressj-onal- attacks on executive power"
(Dallek, 200J, p. 207).

The Presldent, however,

experienced anoLher nightmare as a result of the
failure,

when Ohio National- Guard troops opened

Cambodian

fire at

students during a war protest on the Kent State Univers i t y
campus, killing

four and wounding nine on May 4 , 1970.

This triggered other protests around the country.
-34-

Nlxon

tried to make peace with himself by visiting

student

protesters gathered at the Lincoln Memorlal- on the early
morning of May B. He tried to find a

common bond

with the

crowd through which he could express his concerns.

rnstead, the President digressed to sub-jects that had
nothing to do with concerns about. the war and direction
American foreign poficies.

express his feelings,

Nixon wanted to reach out

but could not.

of
and

Richard Nixon was too

preoccupied with internal- turmoil to listen.
By late 1970, Richard Nixon had faced overwhelming
probrems that Lested hlm physically

and emotionally.

Despite his resolve to end the Vietnam War, the war raged
on.

Nixon f elt that unl-ess he could improve his public

standing by convincing voters that he was ending the war/
hi s

791

2 re-elect ion woul-d be doubt f ul .

The Pres ident

j-nstructed his White House staff to make efforts

to present

the admini-stration in a positive way. Nixon wanted to

be

remembered as a peacemaker, rescuing the world from
corTrmuni

By

st tyranny.
191L, Nixon

was

not only distrustful

of the media;

he began to question the allegiances of his aids.

The

President instructed his staff to make memos of their
conversations.
Butterfield

Later Nixon aides Haldeman and Alexander

hrelped the President lnstal-1 a taping system
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that would secretly record office and telephone
conversations in various White

David, In this way, Nixon

locations and at

House

woul-d have instant

Camp

and accurate

information for historical purposes and to hold people
accountabl-e for what they sald.

anticipate

The President could not

the way that his tapes would make history.

As Nixon's tapes indicate,

the years l9l 1-1972 were

dominated with the President's preoccupation with being re-

elected and establishing
international
presidents"

peace that would be the envy of al-l- future
(DaIlek ,

As a presidential
article

"a foreign policy record advancing

200'7

, p.

247 )

.

candidate in

Nixon wrote in an
in States Foreign Affa-r-rs, t'Taking the long view,
7961 ,

we simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside of

the family of nations, Lhere to nurture its fantasies,
cherish its hates and threaten its neighbors" (MacMi11an,
2001

, p.

6

)

.

The President sai-d, "the mark of a l-eader 'is

whether he can give hi story a
5)

nudgre'

"

(MacMil-l-an

, 200'l ,

p.

.

Richard Nixon had the intel-ligence,
hacked by knowledge of history,

the curiosity,

to be able to take

advantage of changing world situati-ons.

He believed that

through cooperation among nati-ons the suffering and expense
of wars could be prevented; that countries could
-36-

someday

work together for the good of al_I.

against

conrmunism,

but had

Nixon was always firmly

come to an understanding

that

maintaining a balance in the world was more important than
ideological

struggles with adversaries.

Unlike Secretary

of State John EosLer Dulles, who had publicly brushed past
Chou En-Iai's

offered hand at the 1954 Geneva Conference,

Nixon, by L969 was ready for dialogue.
Hostilities

that broke out in mid 1969 between Chinese

and Soviet troops in Northeast China gave N j-xon a chance to

play one country against the other.
that he had to

ma

The President

ke conces s ions to show U . S .

normal:-zing relations.

s

knew

incerity

j-n

By recommendation of the National

Security Council and the State Department, Nixon announced
in April 1971 t.he lifting
restrictions

of twenty-year travel and trade

with China.

A few conservatives sensed that Nixon was yielding to
communism. The President, however, fe1t ".

. that

opening

to China was useful against the Soviets and would help in
Vietriam"

(MacMil-l-an

,

2007

, p. L73) .

Chairman Mao Tse-tung,

anxious about improving Soviet/U. S. relations

and unsure of

a possibl-e growing threat from Japan, invit.ed a U,S. table
tennis team which was playing in Japan to come to China.
"As Mao subsequently described his decisj-on, the

sma11

ping-pong ball could be used to move the large ball of the
-37 -

earth" (MacMillan ,

2OO1,

p.

17B)

. Premier Chou En-Lai

received the team, signifying that Nixon's overtures had
been acknowledged. The President in turn invited the
Chinese table tennis team to the United States
Nixon and Kissinger's

'

back channel secret diplomacy/

keepi ng the State Department and most of Nj-xon's own

advi s or s uninformed caused unnecessary delays and Confusion

in Serious negotiations,
alive"

(

Barber,

7992

,

"[Nixon] needed crj-sis to feel

p . 1 42)

.

Fortunately, at the end of

ApriI 1971, Chou En-Lai responded to the Presidents' fivemonth-o1d secret messages with a personal- invitation
Chairman Mao for Nixon to visit

from

China. Progress for

restored rel-ations conLinued. The United States wit.hdrew
its opposition to China joining the United Nations, but
resisted the expulsion of Taiwan. On July 15, L917, Nlxon
spoke to a national audience about his forthcoming visit

to

China the next year.
\\

^

7t
l:1.D
L
'N

j-xon

I told Kis s inger,

l

Nations must have great

ideas or they cease to be great' " (MacMillan ,

200'7

,

p . 10 )

Richard Nixon's great idea was to become a worl-d statesman
and build permanent world peace. The President had the
i-ns

ight and understanding to do so as he met and clasped

hands for the first

time with Premier Chou En-Lai

February 11. 1972. It was the first
-38-

on

step in formally

.

normal-:-zing rel-ations between the United States and the

People's Republic of China.
As with most foreign affairs

negotiations,

Nixon

insisted that talks between the Chinese leaders and the
American President be shrouded in secrecy.

after his arrival,

Three hours

Nixon was summoned for a short meeLing

with Chairman Mao. Nixon then traveled throughout Chi-na.
At the conclusion, both governments issued the Shanghai
Communiqu6

| a basis for Sino-Amerj-can relations

followed for many years.

In the official

that

was

communiqu6, both

nations pledged to work toward ful1 normal-ization of
diplomatic relations,
Both pledged. *[t]here is one China.
.

.

and

Ta

j-wan is part of China" (MacMillan , 2001 , p. 25 g ) .

This assurance continues t.oday, ds President Georqe W.

Bush

opposes j-ndependence for Taiwan.

Nixon's request for Chinese assistance with a peaceful
withdrawal- of Ameri-cans from Vietnam was turned down.

The

President's anxiety regarding leaving South Vietnam before
the L912 el-ections with a reasonable chance for their
survival- was still

not assured.

Nj-xon, however, did return

from China with an outpouring of praise from both politicalparties as well as the nation.
The Soviet Union, which had warned Nixon in 1969 that
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.

would be a 'very grave miscalculation' if

it

.someone' in the United States were tempted to profit

between China and the Soviet Union at the latter's

the rift

expense" (MacMillan, 2007, p.
amenable to i-mproved relations
May

191

ten

f

from

2 Nixon paid

a

visit

2Bg)

,

now became more

with the United States.

In

to Moscow to negotiate and sign

ormal agreements, the most J-mportant being the

Nuclear-Arms Limitation Treaty, or SALT I

for a joint

Nixon had hopes

U.S.S.R. and U.S. space venture in 1975.

The Moscow Summit produced

a

negotiated secret grain

deal as well as an agreement for a peaceful resolution of
conf licts,

pdrticul-arly

ultimately

did not materialize.

in the Middle East, which
The f inal- product of

Nixon's detente leadership was a conference in HeIsinki.
The f ocus was to be reduction of Cold War risks,

tensi-ons

and costs in Europe. Nixon and Kissinger were pessimistic

that the

conf erence woul-d be successful whereas Europeans

were much more optimistic.

Between July 3,

7, 1975 members of

the Warsaw Pact discussed the

NATO and

future security of Europe.

791

3 and August

The Helsinki Accords,

s

j-gned

-l_n

August 1975 were nonbindi.g, lacked treaty status, and gave

the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe legitimate standing
equals with the democrat j-c regimes in the West, but they
also addressed human rights.

These Accords would be

-40-

as

referenced hy many of the'tNew thinkers" in the soviet
Union, such as Gorbachev, and it can be debated that they
were a signj-ficant

catalyst in the fal-l- of

communism.

Nixon's successes with the communist world and the
mil-itary sophistication he gained from the trials of
Vietnam provided him
American military.

an

The

opport.unity to

modern

LZe the

President ended the draft

increased the benefits of an aII-volunteer
Since the beginning of his presidency,

and

army.
Ni-xon

had been

searching for a way to get the United States out of
Vietnam. He did not. want to

be accused

of abandoning South

Vietnam, but could not convince the Nort.h Vi-etnamese to

negotiate. Nixon tried to use the improved rel-ations wlth
china and the soviet union to pressure the North.

The

President used Lhreats, periodic bombing and signs of

personal irrational behavior to bring the North to
settlement .

a

Nothing worked. when Ni-xon used bombing

operations, positive results

were

short last.ing and in the

end the cofitmunists occupied more territory.

Clearf y, North

Vietnam was in control of the warr wditing for the right

time to make a peace proposal.
Throughout the ordeal, Nixon was not honest with the
American people.

Publicly,

the President continued to

stress that the combination of negotiation and his program
-41 -

the south vietnamese to take over the

of training

responsibilities

for their own country were working '

In

october 1912, counting on Nixon to settl-e before the
?residential

election,

Hanoi proposed an agleement which

was quickly accepted by Kissinger.

When

the South obj ect'ed

the North began broadcasting provisions that both Nixon

and

Kj_ssinger wanted to keep secret, especially with elections

less than one month away. In late October Kissinger
announced, t'Peace is at hand" (Nixon, 200J, p. 5) without

giving details.

After the election,

Nixon persuaded South

Vietnamese President Thieu to participate
On January 2J ,

191

in a settlement.

3 Nixon ended U.S. participation

Vietnam War, achieving his t'indj-spensability
peacemaker" ( DalIek ,

2007 ,

as

in the

a

p. 578).

From the Pinnac].e Down L972-1994

Until his re-el-ect j-on on January 20 , L91 3, Richard
Nixon's bel-ief that t'hard effort could bring success"
(Barber, 1992, p. 741) rang true.

Nixon was a good manager

as Vice President in the Eisenhower admi-nistration
effective
first

change agent/ transformational

term as President.

and

leader in his

Nixon' s character was intact.

The President was renominated 1n 7972. He

was

invigorated by his China and Soviet Union successes and at
-42-

the peak of his PoPularitY.

Democratic candidate George

McGovern, on the other hand, was proposing Pofj-cies that

"placed him far to the left

of most of the electorate"

(GreensLein, 2004, p.103).

**After the Democrats had

settled on McGovern, the po11s suggested Nixon
unbeatable" ( Da1Iek'

2OO'7

,

p. 4 08 ) .

was

Nixon, however, didn' t

trust the PoIls, fearing that el-ect ion result s could oust
him from the presidencY. The President's anxieties set in
motion itlegal

activities

by members of the Commj-ttee to

Reelect the President.
Richard Nixon defeated his Democratj-c challenger by
one of the largest

maj

orities

President.ial elections .

in the history of American

Time Magaz ine made him 'Man of the

Year" in its January 1973 issue.

Nixon's ambitions were to

continue d6tent.e wit.h the Soviet Unlon and come to
settlements in the Middl-e East.

Watergate changed the

Presi-dent.s' p1ans. What started out as " . .

.

a minor

scandal burgeoned into a momentous catastrophe" (Aiken,
L996, p.5) ending in President Nixon's resignation in
disgrace.

Disgrace of Presidential Resig:lation
Less than a month after Nixon's visit

to the sovlet

union, five men connected to the President.'s campaign
-43-

committee and hired by some of Nixon's closest advisors
hidden

were arrested while burglari ztnq and installing

of the

microphones in the Democratic campaign office
Watergate building.

As the news sPread, connecting the
the

burg I a rs to the Nixon White House, aides began to treat

inc i dent as a public relations

disaster.

A full

was the means chosen to deal wit.h the situation

cover

up

insLead of

The White House and Nixon's campaign

objectivity.

committee shredded documents and evaded or refused to

truthfully

answer reporters questions, thus attempting to

dispel a larger picture of potential corruption.
Even though he was at

polls were showing he

was

the height of his popularity
unbeatable, Nixon felt

and

he had to

take steps to assure his presidency before it was too
late.

Nixon could not al1ow power to go beyond his

control,

and he obstructed t.he Federal Bureau of

Investigation

from examining payments made to indicted

burglars to keep them quiet.
Investigators,

however, began to unravel crimes

committed before and after the break-in.

the SenaLe Sel-ect Committee on Presidential
Activities

Testimony before
Campalgn

revealed that the President directed White

House

council John Dean to oversee the cover-up to conceal the
Administration' s involvement.. White House aid Alexander
-44-

revealed that extensj-ve tape recordings existed

Butterfield

of conversations held in Nixon' s offices.
When

special prosecutor Archibald Cox asked for the

tapes to be released, Nixon offered Lranscripts insteadwhen cox re j ected the of f er, Ni-xon f ired him.

in his administration

officials

other high

resigned rather than comply

wlth the order to fire Cox. 'tNixon's 'credibility
moral authority'
.

attrition'

5

67 )

and

was Causing an 'agoni-z).ng j-nch by inch-

of his presidential

power" (Datlek ,

. To compound his problefrs, Vj-ce-President

200'1

, p.

Agnew

resigned amldst charges of wrongdoing as governor of
Maryland. Gerald R. Ford I a popular congressman from
Michigan was selected to succeed Agnew. In March L914t

a

federal grand j ury named Richard Nixon as an unindicted coconspirator in a conspiracy to obstruct j ustice in the
V,[atergate investigation.

Leon Jaworski, who replaced

Cox

as special- Watergate prosecutor, continued to demand the
s

ur rende

r of White House tapes as the

House

Judiciary

Committee began to build an impeachment case against the
Pres

ident

.

Richard Nixon tried to re-establish
authority by t.aking trips

his presidential

to the Middl-e East and Soviet

Union in the spring and suflrmer of

791 4

.

Nixon t ried to

assist Israel with emerging aid when Egypt and Syria
-45-

attacked and tried to take back land rsrael had seized in
the six-day war of 1961 . Nixon's efforts were met with an
embargo on oil- shiPments to the Unlted States from the

Middle East.
The President was

so

distracted by Watergate that

he

Ieft Kissinger in charge of shuttle diplomacY going from
one capitol- to the other seeking agreements. In the Soviet

Union, SALT II negotiations did not go well.

out in the latest

Gromyko were angry about being left

Middle East tal-ks.

Brezhnev and

"Conservative Republi-cans believed that

any arms agreement coming out of the next summit would

be

aimed less at serving the nation's security than saving

Nixon's presidency" (Dallek,

200J

that Nlxon faced made significant

, p. 559) .

The obstacles

advances for a successful

summit lmpossihle.

Nixon tried to hold on to his l-ifelong philosophy of
not giving up to defeat.
him upon his return
flnalty

home.

Watergate, howeverr closed in

on

One recording that the President

subrnitted was the "smoking gun": the recording of

the President ordering the

EBI

to stop the investigation

the Watergate break-in (Dal1ek,

2001

,

p

601) .

recording, President Nj-xon lost all political-

of

With this
support

as

the Judiciary Committee recoilunended impeachment to the full
Flouse of Representatives.

The Nixon presidency was over.
-46-

Nixon announced his resignation on August 8, I914, to take
effect at noon the next day'
toward him

Henry Kissinger said of Nixon: "[h]e fe]t

.a great tenderness-for the tremendous struggle he had
fought within his complex personality,

for his

and for his great aspirations defeated in

vulnerability,

the end by weakness of character' " (Dallek ,

200-7

, p. 508-

60e).
On Sunday, September B, President Ford went on

tel-evision and radio, explained that he wished to put

the country and the terrible

Watergate behind

divi

s

i-on

it had created, and read his proclamatlon of a 'ful1,
free, and absolute pardon' for Nixon (Black, 2007, p.
990. ) .

Nixon's agreed statement said in part that he hoped Ford's
tt'compassionate act' would ease 'the burden of Watergale"'
(Bl-ack,

2007

, p.

990 )

.

Nixon never acknowledged

wrongdoing. "For him surrender is suicide, dn admission of
guilt

and weakness" (Renshon, 1975, p. 446).

Richard Nixon kept a low prof il-e in retirement, trying
to rehabilitate

his image. He wrote many books, most

foreign policy,

drawlng scholars' attention,

little

to affect policy.

but doing

The President died in 1994,

-47 -

on

hoping that history woutd bestow to him what Nixon felt

the greatest honor: the title

of

was

Peacemaker.

Implications for LeadershiP
What wiII

l-eadership?

raised in

Richard Nixon's legacY teach us about

Nixon

was

1y

whe

a f ami

a complicated leader, having been
re crisis seemed ever Present -

His

familiarity with crisis gave Richard a base upon which to
operate in societY and, more specifj-calIy, in his chosen
field of politics.

Nixon rose rapidly through the

ranks by using or creating crises that he could

political

In Nixon's favor was the fact that he had the

then solve.

opportunity to learn several roles in government before

taking the nation's highest political

office.

By the time he became Vice President, Richard Nixon
was the administration's

general- political

expert, having

the most thorough knowl-edge of governmental process,

As

second-in-command under President Eisenhower. Nixon
s

k11lf u1ly

f

ulf illed

that he was given.
Vice

Pres

the transactional
When Eisenhower was

leadership roles

hospitalized, the

j-dent, observed proper prot oco I by presiding over

Cabinet meetings from the Vice President's chair
conducted business from his office

-48-

and

in the Capitol.

Nixon

to provid,e leadership without appearing to

made efforts

lead.
By the time he became President, Nixon had formulated

a r. clear visi-on and direction"
(1991, p. 69) .

as described by steven covey

He was a transformational- leader/ change

agent who had a vision that the international
coul-d l ive in peace.

comfiIunity

The president used his foreign

affairs expertise to try to bring a balance of

Power

hetween nations.

President Nixon's personal life consisted of battles
within himself . The t'compulsive tendency to press an
advantage"

(

Chesen

unconstitutional

,

1-97 3

, p,

1_23

) using illegal,

and

means t.o assure his presidency in

cosL Nixon the presldency.

Watergate became the sobering

endpoint of the President's lifelong
complex personality.

1-912 ,

struggle with his

Nixon' s nobl-e ambitions were def eated

by weakness of character.

Implications For

Dfy

Understanding of Leadership

Richard Nixon's leadershlp style added a twist to
understanding of transformational
t.his study I understood Nixon to

leadershlpbe

.

Prior to

a change aqent,

sometimes thought of as a negative form of

trans f ormational- ]eader

my

a

In his first term, however, Nixon
-49-

had a vision and a sense of ulgency for international
ambitious
cooperation to prevent another war, by initiating

positive relati-ons with the soviets, china, and also
achieving significant domestic refolms ' Nixon' s love for
his country and the positive impact of hls visionary
outcomesr however, were undermined by his shortcomings'
Nixon secretly manipulated his powers and disregarded laws,
especi-al1y in his second term in of f ice. He prolonged the
Vietnam War to avoid the inevitable

office,

loss i-n his term in

thus allowing pain and suffering of those connected

with the conflict to continue. The President dismissed
Vrlatergate as t'a third-rate burglarY" (Dallek, 2001 , p. 622)
and never acknowledged his harmful and illegal

his second term in of f ice, when his count.ry needed him
fol-low through on a positive course domestically
internationally,

Richard Nj-xon failed.

strong convictions,

In

acLions.
t.o

and

Leaders must have

be consistent and admit. when they are

wrong. President Nixon was a transformational

leader, but

his character f l-aws, including a lack of ethics, gave him

a

place in history as one of t.he most notorious presldents in
American history.
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